Why Beijing is so obsessed with projecting power in the South China Sea

When trying to understand a country it helps not just to look in at it – but to look outwards from its perspective and take the long view.

Looking out from its coastline, what China sees is a barrier which could prevent its access to the sea lanes upon which both its domestic and foreign policy depends. This is one reason Beijing will take a seriously dim view of the UK sending its new aircraft carrier into the South China Sea in May, and why the region is the most dangerous potential flashpoint for conflict between the US and China.

China’s domestic policy focus is to maintain an orderly society. That requires economic growth at a level which current domestic consumption cannot yet match. Therefore, China must continue to sell huge volumes of goods around the world which in turn requires secure trading routes. Given that its Belt and Road project is a work in process, and that most trade is still moved across water – China has a problem.

The barrier in front of it is made up of the islands stretching from Japan down to Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. All of these nations are at best suspicious of China’s growing power, and all are US allies. Their territories include several potential choke points which could block China’s access to the oceans and prevent supplies from reaching its ports, thus crushing its economy.

It makes little difference that the US appears to have no intention of blocking these routes, indeed it is wedded to conducting freedom of navigation exercises, but a great power such as China will not allow this scenario to remain feasible if it can prevent it. At the moment it cannot – the American allies mentioned are joined in their concern over China by Vietnam, South Korea, India and Australia. The latter two, along with Japan and the US, are members of the Quad, an informal alliance designed to contain Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific region.

Conflict is not imminent, but the stronger China becomes, the more the danger grows. Beijing has been laying the economic, military, and diplomatic groundwork to be in a position to make good on its claims in the region by the middle of the century, if not before. The size of its economy is expected to at least match that of the US by the end of the decade. Its military may be approaching parity with the US by the end of the 2030s, and already its shore-to-ship missile systems are at a point where, if they choose, they can keep enemy warships far from the coastline. These factors influence the diplomatic battle. China can pick off far away countries with economic bribes to cut relations with Taiwan, but closer to home it needs to demonstrate to its neighbours that it is the future – not the US.

If, over the years, it can persuade countries such as the Philippines to end military relationships with the Americans, it can begin to weaken the barrier in front of it and guarantee its sea routes. It can continue to build its artificial islands in the South China Sea and then threaten to enforce its position that, as sovereign territory, “foreign” naval vessels cannot enter the waters around them. It could do this via military action, but this would be a gamble risking all the gains China has made this century.

There is a scenario in which China takes limited military action against an American ally on a regional issue such as fishing rights, believing that Washington will prefer not to get involved. But the Biden administration is committed to rebuilding the alliances damaged during the Trump years. A lack of response by the US would be a hammer blow to confidence in the American alliance system. Beijing needs to weigh that potential gain against the much more serious loss if its action does lead to an American response which could cripple China’s economy.

Earlier this month, Admiral Philip Davidson, Washington’s senior military commander in the region, said he was concerned that China might invade Taiwan within six years. But this week the US and Japan agreed to “cooperate” against such an event. It’s thought Tokyo is considering using its military to protect US planes and ships going to Taiwan’s aid. The island is regarded by the US alliance as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” sitting just off the Chinese mainland. It not only splits the South China Sea from the waters to the east but is a key bridge in the barrier arcing down from Japan. From China’s perspective, controlling it would link the two seas and protect the mainland. It would also right what most Chinese believe is a historical wrong and return an integral part of the country to the Motherland.

But why risk it? Why risk an incredibly difficult amphibious assault by an untested military, followed by a regional war involving the vast resources of the US which will wreck your economy? Why not instead continue to build, and continue to integrate the neighbours’ economies into your own? Eventually, they may come round to your way of thinking.  

When the moments of tension arise, and when the Chinese breathe diplomatic fire on the UK in May, it’s worth keeping in mind that although wrong moves can result in conflict, there are powerful forces restraining the giant. Deng Xiaoping’s maxim of the 1980s  – “Hide your strength, bide your time’ – is only partially dated. Under President Xi Jinping there is no hiding China’s power, but it can still bide its time.