Optimism and danger march in step. It is hard to believe that Vladimir Putin is happy with the course of events in Ukraine. He may not have expected that the Ukrainians would fight so bravely, and as the German decision to send stingers and anti-tank weapons took almost everyone in the West by surprise, that was also surely true in Moscow. This weekend, Germany became a full member of Nato.
Putin had intended this to be a brief, blitzkrieg war. By now, Kyiv should have fallen while a puppet state, with about as much independence as Belarus, would be emerging to run the bits of Ukraine that Russia did not want. The West, still in shock, would be discussing sanctions and no doubt imposing some. But Europe’s dependence on gas plus its banks’ need for Russian deposits – and its football supporters’ need for oligarch subventions – would all restrict freedom of manoeuvre and alliance cohesion. Putin might have hoped for a gradual resumption of business as usual. This has not happened. Instead, gradual has given way to glacial.
So why did Putin miscalculate? Two factors may be in play. The first is Afghanistan. The Russian President might well have concluded that in stumbling out of Afghanistan, Joe Biden was also scuttling away from superpower status. In geopolitical terms, America had retreated to the old people’s home where its President should also be residing. So Putin thought that he could win some easy prestige to compensate for growing economic weakness. But that was folly. First, as Biden is facing mid-term elections, one humiliation was enough. Second, although a pall had been cast over the US’s might and confidence, this was only the temporary consequence of a bad President. Term limits have their uses.
Which brings us to the second factor. Putin has side-stepped term limits and in consequence has been in office for far too long. Some medical observers detect signs of aging and stress; some psychiatrists believe that there is mental instability. That is not a reassuring prospect. Control of nuclear weapons has never been regarded as psycho-therapeutic. Even so, the West has no option. We must disregard Putin’s latest nuclear posturing.
Instead, there ought to be a ringing affirmation that Nato stands together, including Article 5. An attack on one is an attack on all. We should also provide as much kit as possible. It is still hard to believe that the Russians can be stopped, but the more help for Ukraine, the higher the butcher’s bill for Russia.
Sanctions are also vital. Life must be made as uncomfortable as possible for the complicit oligarchs and, alas, for ordinary Russians. Such evidence as is available does not suggest that the Ukrainian venture is popular. Although older Russians tend to applaud the revival of their country’s prestige, one consequence of harsh living conditions is that older Russians do not enjoy a high life expectancy. Younger ones are more interested in prosperity and freedom, while no one is happy with body-bags.
Obviously, Ukraine is not Afghanistan. Most of the countryside is much better suited to tank thrusts than to guerrilla warfare but there are also the cities. If brave Ukrainians wish to push up the cost of Russian occupation, we should assist them as well as saluting their courage. Apropos courage, let us hope that President Zelensky does not suffer the fate of Jan Masaryk or Imre Nagy.
Until recently, it was possible to hope for favourable developments in relations with Russia. Putin had played a weak hand well, without really making it clear why he had a strategic quarrel with the West. At times, he seemed to be acting like a dissed teenager. So a modus vivendi might be in reach.
That is no longer true. At some stage, he moved irrevocably across to the dark side. As the Putin-sceptics – or should that be Putin-phobes? – had long insisted, he was just a neo-Stalinist kleptocrat. He has been making trouble all over the place, from the Arctic to the Sahel, even stopping off in Catalonia to stir up separatism. Wherever he sees Western weakness, he will move in like a wasp on rotting fruit.
In response, we must return to the late 1940s and produce a modern version of George Kennan’s Long Telegram, the progenitor of the doctrine of containment. For the next few years, we should be committed to containment, possibly to the extent of a second Cold War.
That said, there may be some reason for cautious optimism. At home, Putin is not as popular as he was. Social media can also be used against him and there are brave Russians willing to protest. It is also hard to believe that all his oligarch allies will be happy to be sanctioned and denied access to their homes and yachts in the West. We should reach out to anyone who could assist in destabilising Putin.
In general, we should also hold out the prospect of magnanimity in victory, always making it clear that our quarrel is with Putin, not with Russia and its people. Russia is a great nation. Its people, who have suffered so much over the centuries, deserve much better and in achieving it, will enrich Europe – and indeed all mankind. As it is, their hopes have been hijacked by a homicidal gangster and his mafia associates. We must do everything possible to help Russia to remove him.
That is the easy bit: rhetoric. While the Ukrainians endure their Calvary, our leaders must earn the accolade of statesmanship by hard thinking and judicious action. That should keep danger at bay and who knows? It might also help the Ukrainians – and the Russians – to regain their freedom.