UK defence review ignores the elephant in the room: an unreliable America

The possibility that the US may be turning into an unreliable ally is unwritten, though it must surely be the strongest argument for increasing Britain's security capability.

via Number 20/ Flickr

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) is much grittier and more far reaching than the report produced for Boris Johnson by the academic John Bew in 2021. Back then it still seemed reasonable to theorise about Britain’s global role and recommend small changes to focus defence expenditure.

In truth, the UK then, along with the rest of the democratic international community, had not yet woken up to the clear and present threat from Putin’s Russia even though Crimea had been illegally annexed seven years previously and Russia’s little green men were already fighting in Ukraine’s eastern provinces.

Now, “The world has changed”, according to the opening words of Defence Secretary John Healey’s foreword to the SDR. “The threats we now face are more serious and less predictable than at any time since the Cold War.”

In short, the barbarians are at the gates. Defending the realm could give Sir Keir Starmer the sense of purpose which he has been groping for since last summer’s election victory. Not quite Churchill, or even Boris Johnson, he seems credible this week declaring: “My first duty as Prime Minister is to keep the British people safe”.

The government has promptly accepted all 62 of the recommendations from former Labour Defence Secretary and NATO Secretary, General George Robertson, Ex-British Military top brass General Sir Richard Barrons, and the British-born Russia expert and former Trump staffer Dr Fiona Hill. Their proposals are practical and, if implemented, could greatly enhance the UK’s ability to defend itself over the next ten years.

Though some mutter “not enough”, there has been a broad welcome from defence professionals and across the political spectrum for the reommended enhancements and adjustments to the UK’s defence capability. Increasing cyber warfare capability, AI and drones, improved living conditions for troops, restocking the arsenal from six new munitions factory, better submarines, ships and planes, finding a use for the two aircraft carriers, and possible sea and air born platforms for the nuclear deterrent all seem both sensible and necessary.

That is as good as it gets. Practically everyone agrees on moving to “warfighting readiness” but the government is flatly refusing to commit to finding the money which the SDR authors say is essential to achieve it. Ministers have already moved on to bickering over the next “review” - the spending review due next week.

The UK is set to spend 2.5% of GDP on defence by the end of this parliament, thanks to a raid on foreign aid – largely painless for the domestic electorate if not its recipients. Nothing is guaranteed after that. The government will only say it is confident that the next parliament will find the required funding to hit 3% by 2034. Meanwhile, the current NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is expected to call for at least 3.5% by the end of this decade at the summit later this month.

A YouGov Opinion poll published on the day of the SDR explains the Prime Minister’s caution. The plurality of about half of those questioned, 49%, think UK defence spending should increase. Labour voters, 45%, are the least in favour. But over all a clear majority, 57%, oppose tax increases on themselves to pay for it and 53% oppose cuts in other areas of public spending to find the money for defence.

The Prime Minister also seems hesitant to make the case for greater defence and security in principle. He is happier talking about a notional “defence dividend” from more defence spending “creating jobs, wealth and opportunity in every corner of our country”. This explains why he prefers to make his public statements standing in front of a crowd of “working people”, preferably young, who he believes will benefit.

Since the end of the Cold War, and even during it, Britain and its allies, including the US, enjoyed a “peace dividend” as cuts to the military freed up money for social spending. “A defence dividend” for civilians is more uncertain. A war economy can be good for growth – as Russia is experiencing now – but only if the money is found for dramatically defence high spending in a rebalanced economy. The SDR is not proposing that, nor does the UK have the financial resources to go for it now and pay later as in the Second World War.

This SDR is premised on a changed world but it does not look back to what has been left behind. We are no longer in the “Unipolar Moment” when western strength made the use of force an optional extra for “liberal interventionism” to improve circumstances for those less fortunate than ourselves. Nor are western leaders pre-occupied with the troubling but never existential “war on terror”.

The report is littered with words such as “unpredictability”, “instability” and “growing multipolarity” but it never quite defines precisely what the threats we face are. Co-author General Barrons is blunter in interviews. “We can no longer assume people will leave us alone”, he told Times Radio, while suggesting that “big” countries now seem inclined to try and push middle-sized ones around.

The report’s greatest weakness is that it does not or perhaps cannot prematurely grapple with the orange elephant in the room. The possibility that the US may be turning into an unreliable ally is unwritten, though it must surely be the strongest argument for increasing the UK security capability.

The SDR pleads that it is a priority to “maximise the relationship’s potential” with “the UK’s closest defence and security ally”. UK Ministers agree that the special relationship must be kept alive and have gone out of their way to flatter the likes of “Pete” Hegseth and “JD” Vance, in defiance of British public hostility towards the Trump Administration.

Uncertainty about the US is left implicit as the SDR lays out a “‘NATO First’ approach to deterrence and defence”. With luck, “Collective, Security, underpinned by formal alliances and partnerships” may well keep the US bound in. If not, the SDR envisions the UK as a regional rather than global power, working with other allies under the NATO umbrella in what it calls the “Euro-Atlantic”. The SDR describes France as “fundamental”, sees “opportunities for enhanced partnership” with Germany, notes “close bonds” with Norway, finds Canada “essential” and recognises the “potential” of the Joint Expeditionary Force with Scandinavian and Baltic nations.

The evolving complexities of the UK’s security are common ground for what might be called the defence establishment. The electorate is not on the same page regarding the threat as the authors of the SDR. Political leaders on all sides have been reluctant to spell it out the full implications of the changed world to their voters. This review creates an opening for that conversation.

If the Prime Minister means what he says about his first duty, he will have to defy public opinion and take on his own party to shift the mood decisively. The much worse alternative is that terrible events will do the job for him.