Trump’s visit heralds the end of the multilateral world. What comes next?
On April 4th 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the foreign ministers of twelve nations led by the United States. The UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Iceland, and Canada all agreed to a joint declaration of collective defence. Greece and Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation four years later. West Germany joined in 1955, and the Spanish in 1982. After the fall of communism, more countries became partners in one of the most successful organisations in diplomatic and military history.
Why did they join? Nato was, or is still supposed to be, built on a beautifully simple and meaningful idea that freedom should be protected. That day the treaty was signed, President Truman encapsulated the mission of Nato, telling the foreign ministers gathered in Washington: “In this pact we hope to create a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression, a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens.”
The aim in 1949 was not only to deter aggression, from Communist states led by the Soviet Union. More broadly, Nato sought to support peace in the world.
Next year, Nato will celebrate – if that’s the right word in the circumstances – its 70th birthday. At this rate it will not be much of a party, because for the first time the United States has a president who is highly sceptical of Nato. And he arrives in Europe like a whirlwind this week.
The president will visit the UK, meet with fellow Nato leaders in Brussels, and have a one to one with his favourite leader, other than himself, Vladimir Putin of Russia.
Trump is right on funding. According to Nato’s own figures, only five member countries in 2017 spent more than 2% of their GDP on defence. That is the US (3.6%), the UK (2%), Greece (2.4%), Poland (2%) and Estonia (2.1%).
Trump’s beef on Nato seems to be about more than money though. In his head or heart there is no elementary attachment to that core founding idea that I mentioned, that every US president since Truman has subscribed to.
Accordingly, European leaders are deeply worried about Trump’s intentions and what that could usher in if with a stray tweet he signals full withdrawal from Nato, or more likely issues a deadline for more European spending, or backs Russian claims of concern about minority Russians in neighbouring countries.
One of Putin’s main strategic aims is the destruction of Nato, partly for kicks and partly because the end of Nato might open up the potential for Russia to retake the Baltic states – who are understandably deeply concerned – and to extend its cultural and economic reach back into the Eastern Europe from which it was expelled at the end of the Cold War.
Putin, said Trump, in a speech delivered this week was a KGB man which was “fine.” This blithe assertion overlooks the reality that the KGB was one of the most brutal organisations on the face of the earth, that tortured and suppressed its population to sustain a wicked tyranny. Trump seems to prefer Putin’s Russia to the West, a situation unthinkable under any previous President. Barack Obama began the US drift from Europe, but too cool for school Obama never actually preferred mob-boss Russia to democratic Germany. Trump does.
Can anything be done to inspire a change in Trump’s thinking? The UK and French governments, Europe’s two main defence powers, will try to be firm and there will be a chorus of eminent warning voices. On Monday, the London think tank Policy Exchange will publish a collection of essays by high-powered and authoritative figures making the case for Nato and defending Europe, edited by the biographer of Clement Attlee and brilliant young Atlanticist historian John Bew.
But Trump is not known for listening, even to his own staff, never mind foreign leaders, statesmen, historians or think tanks. The best hope is that reports of grave concern make their way to the US Embassy and are passed on by the Ambassador, a businessman Trump respects, in a manner that might grab his attention. The US defence secretary James Mattis is already deeply worried, it is said, although away from Trump’s rhetoric operationally US forces are looking to scale up in Eastern Europe.
Last month, the Senate Armed Service Committee asked the Pentagon to consider reviewing American deployments to deter Russia by “forward-stationing” troops. The committee suggested a brigade combat unit stationed in Poland. The Poles are keen to host a division.
Perhaps sense will win out. Or Putin will tweak Trump’s overly-long tie when they meet, in the process reminding the president who the US’s real friends are supposed to be. Perhaps Trump will pull back from weakening the prime organisation dedicated to western collective defence.
Do not hold your breath.
Trump is inherently sceptical of cooperative multilateral institutions. Time and again he shows it. The European Union was established he said recently, in one of his woefully wrong horrible history lectures, to exploit and undermine the United States. You don’t have to be a fan of the EU to know that is nonsense. The EU was established to exploit and undermine Britain. Joke, that was a joke. The EU was designed to encourage trade and through political integration render redundant any notion that European states would ever fight each other again.
Trump is also dismissive of the World Trade Organisation. The United Nations he holds in contempt. His presidency seems to signal the end of the multilateral world as we know it.
What comes next for those of us living in Europe?
We had better get ready and we had better rethink, fast. Even if talk of US withdrawal turns out to be a brief Trumpian storm, or a future president rebuilds traditional alliances, we will still be in a better position after a Trump second term if European states – inside the EU and outside the EU – have had a proper conversation about security and taken robust action on protecting Europe from hybrid war and more traditional threats. Britain has been examining its navel on Brexit and increased NHS spending of late, whereas increased defence spending (and aiming for 3% of GDP) should be equally high on the agenda.
In this historic context, the muppet-like machinations of the British cabinet and the tight-arsed tetchiness of chief negotiator for the EU Michel Barnier look particularly footling.
Mercifully, some people are trying to warn the participants that at this moment it is particularly daft to treat the UK like a security threat, which is implied in the European Commission’s rude dismissal of the UK on the Galileo project. In that spirit, Horst Seehofer, the German interior minister, who wrote a letter published this week attacking Brussels for risking lives stood out.
If Trump dumps Nato, or wounds it, German interests will need particularly sensitive handling in the aftermath. Ulrich Speck, a German foreign policy expert, put it well this week: “Germany as a state is built for a symbiotic relationship with the US: no surprise given the history since 1949. It has happily accepted US leadership on defense and strategy in return for material wellbeing, security and freedom. This business model is not working anymore.”
If Germany needs to become more assertive, will its peaceable population put up with it? The answer may be for Germany to pay much more of the bill that can then be spent by other European nations.
What might this rethink look like? There are two choices, other than giving up which is not an option. Either the European states have to pay much more for Nato, taking on more responsibility. Or, in the most extreme circumstances, with Russia intent on more havoc, from the wreckage of Nato next year a successor will have to be built with France and Britain to the fore.
On that cheery note, have a good weekend. If you’re in the cabinet I hope you got home from Chequers in time for breakfast on Saturday. I’ll write my take on the results – Chequers, not the football – over the weekend.
Iain Martin,
Editor and publisher,
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