There is a logic to elections in Iran. The regime allows the rituals of popular democracy to proceed, but only under the strict condition that they must never transform the political landscape. The Islamic revolutionary regime created in 1979 permits the voicing of alternative views and even allows, to a certain degree, a form of representative government.
But ultimately there is an iron law: political radicalism must never compromise the regime; reformism must never be allowed to triumph over the Revolution; and the voters must not prevail. This fact is well known among those who play the game, from the ultra-conservatives who vigorously push the line of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to the reformists movements who dream of a new Iran.
Iran is going to the polls today in the first round of an election which follows on the heels of economic sanctions, radical protests and foreign policy tensions. A total of 58 million voters across the country are eligible to vote. Yet there is something more ritualistic than real about this exercise.
The choice of representatives is carefully vetted by the Supreme Leader and Iran’s Guardian Council. This is a body which is composed of six fuqaha – elite clerics – and six judges and whose role it is to interpret the constitution in the light of the Shia faith. Its members are appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and its decisions are reinforced by the hard power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
In the wake of the unrest which has rocked the regime domestically since fuel protests broke out in November and a refreshed wave of popular outrage emerged in January, the regime believes it desperately needs to regain momentum. These demonstrations have been quelled by the strong arm of the state, but not before they succeeded in galvanising opposition to the regime among a broad and radical coalition among both idealistic students and workers hit hard by rising prices.
President Trump’s economic sanctions, applying the policy of “maximum pressure” upon the country’s government, have hit Iranian oil revenues, ramped up inflation, and led to shortages of medical supplies. The leadership in Tehran are still reeling from the aftermath of the crisis created when General Qasem Soleimani was killed by a US airstrike in January.
This time the government in Tehran are taking no chances. The Atlantic Council, a think tank on international affairs, has described the election as “the most uncompetitive in years”. The regime has stepped up its measures to take command of the process, with the Guardian Council weighing in. The institution has announced the purge of 7,296 candidates – reformists, moderate, and conservatives – and prevented them from standing for election. A third of sitting members of the Majlis have been forced to stand down.
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Caution in the regime is running high, and voter apathy is rampant, especially in the capital, Tehran. Many have said that they plan to boycott the election altogether. The regime clearly has a legitimacy problem, but this will not stop it from consolidating support among its conservative supporters.
The real contest in this election will not be between the forces of order and reform. What matters is a fierce battle being fought between the factions of Iranian conservatism, with various jostling parties seeking to gain control. It will be a showdown between the conservatives and the ultra-conservatives, a run-off between a host of pro-Revolution voices – and it’s set to be a landslide for the regime.
The Supreme Leader, Khamenei, believes that he now has an opportunity to turn to a younger, ultra-conservative movement in order to breathe new life into the Revolution. In February 2019, he released a statement calling for a “second step” in the Islamic revolution to begin and to be spearheaded by the “youth”. Now he may take this election as his chance and pivot towards a new generation of political leadership.
This brought him into conflict with the country’s President, the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who has spoken out against the regime’s tight controlling of the vote. He declared: “This way is not an election…This is not diversity.” He warned that the Guardians and Khamenei were turning “a large population into the opposition.”
Yet, for all his qualms, Rouhani himself knows the rituals of Iranian democracy and he knows the rules of the game. He has not told voters to boycott the election. He has instead encouraged cooperation, and urged Iranians to come together and vote to resolve the country’s problems. There is a certain usefulness in having a moderate like Rouhani to voice an abstract sense of disquiet while remaining firmly within the fold.
The methods employed by the regime are not new. In 1997, the reformist president Mohammed Khatami rode a wave of optimism into office on a promise to reform the revolutionary system. Khatami hoped to root out endemic corruption as well as open Iran up to free markets and diplomatic relations with the West. Throughout his eight years in office, however, he was persistently neutralised by the Guardians, hamstrung by Khamenei, and crippled by the inherent conservatism of Iran’s institutions.
The “Green movement” of 2009, which emerged in the aftermath of the controversial election in which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elevated to the Presidency in a contest widely considered to be fraudulent, was also silenced. It was broken by the same combination of hard force and persistent patience. The logic of Iranian politics – that reform must never overcome the Revolution – had reasserted itself once again.
This is a regime that has become used to out-waiting, and out-muscling, its opponents. Indeed, among the many theological works authored by Khamenei is A Discourse on Patience. The regime knows that it has the apparatus of power in its hands, and it is prepared to see off the storms of unrest which the Supreme Leader believes to be caused by foreign satanic forces.
Iran’s protestors are incredibly brave and many of them have become increasingly radicalised by recent experiences. But bravery alone will not be enough to redefine a country still so powerfully shaped by its revolutionary past. Expect outbreaks of disaffection to continue – but if, as expected, hardline forces triumph in this election, the dreams of Iranian reformists will seem as far away as ever.


