Home Office plan to infiltrate citizens' phones undermines Britain's cybersecurity

The UK government's demand that Apple weakens encryption violates individual privacy and opens the door to catastrophic cyberattacks.

via Alamy/ GEY7BT

Imagine being told to leave your windows open so the government can peek inside to see if you’re up to no good. Sound absurd? That’s essentially what the Home Office is demanding of Apple — to weaken encryption on iCloud and grant British officials global snooping rights.

Apple has now retaliated with a legal challenge. In a deeply invasive move which sounds straight out of a dystopian novel, the government risks jeopardising citizens' privacy and creating a gateway for hackers to exploit the backdoor, putting us all at risk.

The justification? National security, of course. But while ministers spin tales of foiling terror plots, they ignore the glaring risks: this is an egregious attack on individual freedom. What’s more, once you create a backdoor, anyone can barge through with enough effort. Hackers, scammers, even hostile governments will be queuing up to exploit what should never have existed in the first place. This power-grab from the Home Office will make us less safe, not more.

It’s also a brazen attack on the right to privacy. The idea the state should have the power to freely undermine encryption — and by extension, our personal data along with its security — is an alarming move towards a mass surveillance state. Whitehall is seemingly oblivious to the irony of claiming to protect citizens by dismantling the protections which keep us safe from overreach, cybercrime, and surveillance. This is a betrayal of liberty, wrapped up in a cloak of "security" which will only make us more vulnerable.

Apple famously told the FBI to get lost when it asked to roll back encryption in a similar move in 2019. And, if the British government does not back down, the tech giant has threatened to “pull security services from the UK market rather than comply with any government demands to weaken them”. Therefore, the Home Office’s latest demand may force users to say goodbye to secure end-to-end encryption entirely, making us digital sitting ducks. No doubt, if Apple has been given this ultimatum, it is only a matter of time before other tech giants like Meta and Google are ordered to give up users’ integrity, unless they already have…

If tech giants withdraw security features, cybercriminals will thrive. Accounting for an estimated 37% of all crime in England and Wales, fraud is already one of the biggest threats to British citizens. A backdoor to vast amounts of personal data may expose further data for criminals to exploit.

Privacy isn’t a luxury — it’s a right. But the Home Office continues to ignore this fundamental truth.

To make matters worse, the government’s plan to force Apple’s hand is shrouded in secrecy. Under UK law, Apple isn’t allowed to warn users when their privacy is being dismantled. Orwell would be blushing. The Snoopers' Charter of 2016, the Investigatory Powers Bill, is being reintroduced with harsher provisions in 2024, now demanding Apple grants the government unfettered access to encrypted data worldwide.

This reckless move isn’t just about privacy; it’s a gift to hackers. Encryption secures everything from financial transactions to communications between journalists and whistleblowers. Dismantling it at the will of the government is nothing short of catastrophic, compromising the very foundation of trust that keeps the digital ecosystem intact. Britain’s bureaucrats seem to believe they can build in backdoors for only the “good guys.” But cryptography doesn’t work like that. Once a weakness is created, it’s there for anyone to exploit — including rogue states and hackers. Weakening encryption won’t stop national security threats; it will only make ordinary citizens more vulnerable.

What’s more, the UK’s demand for a backdoor into iCloud has been absurdly paired with the decision to exempt China from tough new security laws. Ministers seem to think they can compromise digital security for the sake of national safety while underestimating the direct digital threat from hostile nations, who will attempt to pry through newly created secret access routes. This dangerous contradiction suggests that the UK is more concerned with spying on its own citizens than recognizing one of our most formidable adversaries and the threat to national security posed from Beijing.

Keir Starmer’s soft stance on China in the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) reeks of desperation. By exempting Beijing from the enhanced tier, the government turns a blind eye to one of the world’s most active espionage threats, all for the sake of trade deals. Sir Iain Duncan Smith told The i Paper this move is “humiliating”; it reveals how recklessly the government is undermining national security.

Responding to the news, Interim Director of Privacy and Civil Liberties at campaign group Big Brother Watch, Rebecca Vincent, called the move “an unprecedented attack on privacy rights that has no place in any democracy”, rightfully commenting that “we all want the government to be able to effectively tackle crime and terrorism, but breaking encryption will not make us safer. Instead, it will erode the fundamental rights and civil liberties of the entire population – and it will not stop with Apple.”

Despite ranking in Tier 1 on the Global Cybersecurity Index 2024, making the UK one of the 46 most cyber secure countries in the world, the UK is placing itself at serious risk of major data leaks with the Home Office’s encryption plans. If Yvette Cooper’s invasive plans go ahead, Britain is poised to become a global embarrassment when, not if, an inevitable data leak occurs.

The Home Office’s insistence on compromising encryption puts everyone at risk. Protecting the public means protecting their data — but the government seems determined to learn this lesson the hard way.

Tristan is a political commentator with Young Voices UK. He is the President of the Friedrich von Hayek Society at LSE and is a former intern at both the Adam Smith Institute and the IEA.