English nationalism threatens the Union

It is one of the enduring ironies of the Brexit imbroglio that the sternest advocates of leaving the European Union are also the staunchest defenders of the UK’s territorial integrity.

It is apparently right and proper, and natural, for Scotland (population 5.5 million), Wales (3 million) and Northern Ireland (1.8 million) to accept the dominance of England (55 million), but not for the English to be part of a larger union with 27 other European states that has helped ensure its prosperity and amplified its voice in the world for the last 45 years.

In 2016, England voted to Leave the EU by a margin of 53.4 per cent to 46.6 per cent. Had it not been for the strongly pro-Remain vote in London – essentially a global rather than an English city – Leave would have won by a landslide. In Scotland, the result was 62 per cent for Remain, 38 per cent for Leave. Northern Ireland went 55.8 per cent Remain, 44.2 per cent Leave. Wales – as ever tied to England’s apron strings – came down 52.5 per cent for Leave and 47.5 per cent for Remain.

If each of the four nations had held on to its sovereignty within the union, Scotland and Northern Ireland would now be looking to continued EU membership. As it is, the vote in England was the one that counted. Even if Wales had thrown its hat in the ring with its Celtic brethren, proud Albion would still have carried the day.

After that, what mattered to voters, wherever they lived, was that England should negotiate a dignified and, as far as possible, “frictionless” Brexit that kept the country closely allied to the EU in respect of access and trade. This it has signally failed to do, making a hard or No Deal Brexit the most likely outcome.

I say “England” because it is English Tories who are calling the shots. The two Scots nearest to the process, Liam Fox and Michael Gove, both sit for English constituencies. All five members of the UK negotiating team, including the Prime Minister, are English, and all five, like Gove, are graduates of Oxford, the English Establishment’s principal training ground.

Opposed to Brexit, outside of England, are the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, Sinn Fein and the SDLP. Most Scottish and Welsh Labour MPs are also Remainers, as are Ruth Davidson, the leader of the Scottish Conservatives, and the Lib Dems’ four Scottish MPs.

In fact, within the Celtic fringe, only the DUP, with its ten hardline MPs, is in favour of the split with Europe, and this for no other reason than that it underlines and reinforces the distinction between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Who would have thought that in 2018, it would still be possible to play the Orange card?

The argument against breaking up the United Kingdom is that it can only be done with the consent of a majority in any one of the four nations, and here the argument until recent days has been less than compelling. In the referendum held in 2014, Scotland voted by 55 per cent to 45 per cent in favour of the Union. The last border poll in Northern Ireland was held in 1973 and was boycotted by nationalists and Republicans, resulting in a 98 per cent vote to keep the province British. ‎Wales – “annexed” by the English in medieval times – has thus far shown little enthusiasm for independence, preferring to demonstrate its cultural independence through language, druidic costumes and male voice choirs.

But times are changing. A hard Brexit, leading to a hard border in Ireland, would galvanise nationalist sentiment in favour of reunification. Given that Catholics are expected to become a majority of the Northern electorate within the next five years and that a small but growing percentage of Protestants now supports Irish unity, the next border poll, expected to be held within five years, could well spell the end of the British link. Conversely, a Brexit that includes the Irish backstop, keeping the province as an EU protectorate, with no border and the same regulations and standards applying to all 32 counties, would only serve to underscore the belief that Dublin and Brussels are the future, not London.

In parallel with this, a hard or No Deal Brexit, can only serve to revive the fortunes of the SNP in Scotland. The Scots, including many Unionists, are constitutionally pro-European. They are happy enough to coexist with the “auld enemy” when times are good. They’ve known them a long time. But nothing is forever. Should their living standards plummet while at the same time they are distanced from Europe against their will, the likelihood of a second referendum resulting in a vote for independence is surely increased.

Which only leaves Wales. According to recent polls, the Welsh, like the Scots and Northern Irish, are distinctly unhappy about the way in which the Brexit negotiations are going. Unless there is a dramatic last-minute turnaround, the anger that is there must eventually find its expression in nationalism. Who knows? Ten years from now, if Scotland has achieved its independence and Ireland is finally united, with each of them invested in the European Project, even Wales might reconsider its position.

In the past, it has been argued that the EU is not ready to do Edinburgh any favours. According to Unionist doomsayers, Scotland would have to wait years to be accepted back into the fold, and then only on condition that it embraces the single currency. I fail to see the problem with this. Brussels would love to have England surrounded, and with the pound likely to come under renewed pressure in the years ahead, the euro might just represent safer money in the bank. We are told that Northern Ireland would be grandfathered in as part of an existing member state, so what reason would there be not to fast-track the Scots, EU members since 1973?

How would the English then feel? Would they feel liberated? Would they rejoice in the prospect of an end to the multi-billion-pound subsidies paid out each year to Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast? Or, with England on its own less than a quarter the size of France, would they feel deserted and betrayed? If Theresa May doesn’t want to be held responsible for the slow disintegration of her homeland, she had better change tack, and fast.