Coronavirus: the Singapore-style tracing app coming to Britain

An app to help to track and trace the spread of coronavirus, is being developed for the UK government. The development is being led by NHS England’s innovation unit NHSX.

It is modelled on Singapore’s TraceTogether mobile app. That has raised privacy concerns in Britain because Singapore has an authoritarian government.

But how does the Singapore app actually work?

The system relies on users’ consent to share data and sharply limits the amount of information gathered and shared. This should help allay concerns which have been raised about efforts to digitally track those who test positive for coronavirus.

The app released by the Singaporean government is downloaded on a voluntary basis – registering requires no personal details other than a phone number, and the app does not access information stored on phones such as contacts or address books.

Once installed the app works by using short-range Bluetooth signals. Phones with the app installed detect when they are in close proximity to each other, and for roughly how long, without tracking the location where this occurred.

Data recording these meetings are then encrypted on the patient’s phone. If someone is diagnosed with coronavirus or is identified as a close contact of a known case then, and only, then they are asked to send the data gathered to the Singaporean Ministry of Health. Although, as Singaporeans who test positive for coronavirus are required by law to help the government retrace their movements the final step is essentially mandatory.

Finally, data stored on the phone by this app is automatically deleted after 21 days, which covers the virus’ incubation period. The app itself will cease to function once the outbreak is over.

While some concerns still linger the system is widely seen as the gold-standard when it comes to the tricky business of balancing the right to privacy against track and trace, which requires information on the daily movements of thousands of people infected with coronavirus.

Even Germany, whose past history mass surveillance has made it admirably privacy conscious, is looking to adopt a similar system. Furthermore, NHSX is also planning to form an Ethics Board to oversee the use of the data their programme gathers.

Of course, in order to implement this system effectively other challenges will have to be overcome. The most important one is that this system will have to work in conjunction with effective mass testing of the population, something the UK government is also working on.

The other major challenge is that while download of the app is voluntary it needs a large number of citizens to download it in order to make it effective. Hopefully, the natural desire to stay safe and a sense of social responsibility should encourage Britons to do so, especially if their privacy concerns are allayed.

There is another problem, though. The fact that 22% of UK adults, 45% of UK adults over 55, do not have smartphones will be an issue. To cover these gaps good old-fashioned legwork by investigative teams – perhaps a mix of police and public health officials – will be needed.

The Bluetooth system has its best advantages in built-up urban areas where the virus can spread most easily. Tracking systems used elsewhere use phone GPS data to track the location of someone who had tested positive for coronavirus, as opposed to the Bluetooth system, which has the potential to create false alarms. People one floor up or down from the infectious person could register as being in the same location.

However, it would also allow blanket warnings to be issued to anyone who had been in these areas at the same time as the infectious person. This could help contact some who would otherwise slip through the cracks, but also comes with potential major privacy issues.

In China the state’s Orwellian mass surveillance and social credit system was adapted to track people and enforce quarantines. Health tracking apps developed by private Chinese companies have also been found to send their data to the police. In Israel the use of the country’s intelligence agency, Shin Bet, to track the location potential coronavirus cases using their mobile phone data has also been dogged with controversy.

In South Korea, police can access not just location data but security camera footage and credit card records in order to retrace the footsteps of people who have tested positive for coronavirus. Furthermore, people diagnosed with coronavirus have their age, gender, and locations they have visited broadcast so people can check whether they had been in close proximity to them. While names are not included there is still a great deal of potential for embarrassing revelations.

Curious South Korean citizens poring over the notices have laughed about the case of man who contracted the virus from an instructor at a sexual harassment class, as well as speculated about those being tracked potentially visiting prostitutes, having affairs, or committing insurance fraud. Some of these stories have been disproved by media outlets. While this may have provided some relief, it also undermines the aim of not stigmatising people who have tested positive by concealing their names.

If Britain adopts this app, there will need to continual reassurance on privacy concerns.